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Abstract  
This Essay traces David Little’s pioneering work on religion, human rights, and 
religious freedom over the past half century, and its distillation in a recent collection of 
his essays and a Festschrift in his honor.  
           Keywords: David Little; human rights; religious freedom; conscience; free 
exercise of religion; Roger Williams; John Calvin; Calvinism; malum in se; religious 
skepticism; natural law; natural rights; self-evidence; harm principle; gratuitous pain; 
two-tiered rights theory 
 
David Little, Essays on Religion and Human Rights: Ground to Stand On. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xvi + 403. $99.00 (cloth).  ISBN: 
97811070722626 
Religion and Public Policy: Human Rights, Conflict and Ethics – A Festschrift in Honor 
of David Little. Edited by Sumner B. Twiss, Marian Gh. Simion, and Rodney L. 
Petersen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xl + 372, $99.00 (cloth).  
ISBN: 9781107090361 
 
David Little has pioneered the study of religion, human rights, and religious 
freedom during 55 years of distinguished scholarly work at Yale, Harvard, Virginia, 
Georgetown, and the United States Institute of Peace. Starting with his first major book, 
Religion, Order, and Law: A Study in Pre-Revolutionary England (1969), he has traced 
cardinal principles like freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion from their 
earliest formulations in Stoic philosophy and Roman law, through the writings of 
Augustine, Aquinas, the medieval canonists and scholastics, and their many early 
modern heirs.  Among the latter, he has explored most deeply the contributions of 
Protestants to the Western understanding of human rights and religious freedom, with 
special focus on John Calvin, John Locke, Roger Williams, and Reinhold Niebuhr, all of 
 
 
whose ideas he connects to each other and to the broader Western tradition in fresh 
and inventive ways.  He has written astutely on the vexed questions arising under the 
First Amendment’s guarantees of no government establishments of religion and no 
prohibitions on its free exercise.  And he has charted many of the religious sources and 
dimensions of modern human rights, particularly the fundamental international 
protections of freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, freedom from religious 
hatred, incitement, and discrimination, and freedom for religious and cultural self-
determination.   
Little has also worked extensively on broader questions of religion, public policy, 
and peacebuilding. He has offered insightful and incisive treatments of violence and 
terrorism, nationalism and foreign policy, just war and just peace-making in such places 
as Vietnam, Ukraine, Sri Lanka, Tibet, and Iraq – and recently coedited the Oxford 
Handbook on Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding (2015).  He has engaged deeply 
with scholars of Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and other faiths in developing the field of 
interreligious ethics, publishing a classic text, Comparative Religious Ethics (1978), with 
his longstanding coworkers, John Kelsay and Sumner Twiss.  Little has earnestly 
defended a form of liberalism that leaves ample room for religion in all forms and forums 
of public life.  And he has issued devastating criticisms of both secularists and 
religionists who are critical of human rights as a core feature of democratic government 
and international diplomacy – from Jeremy Bentham and David Hume to Richard Rorty 
and Alasdair MacIntyre.  All of his work is marked by clear, candid, and concise prose, 
close exegesis, analytical precision, trenchant criticism, engaging synthesis, and 
historical, theological, and philosophical gravitas.   
The two books under review illustrate, evaluate, and elaborate Professor Little’s 
prodigious contributions to these fields.  First, Essays on Religion and Human Rights 
collects a dozen of Little’s new and updated studies, with a bracing foreword by John 
Kelsay. Second, Religion and Public Policy places Little’s life work under the critical 
review of seventeen former students and colleagues, with a strong Introduction by 
Sumner Twiss, and an engaging Afterword by Little himself.    
In several of the Essays, Little extends his attack on rights critics, now including 
Samuel Moyn, Talal Asad, Brian Leiter, Winnifred Sullivan, and others who, in his view, 
trade in badly distorted histories, gleefully abstracted idealism, and cynical 
deconstructions of human rights that leave the world with too few resources for political 
order or lasting peace.  Other chapters offer respectful but probing engagement with 
major Islamic scholars of human rights like Abdullahi An-Na’im and Abdulaziz 
Sachedina, and with various liberal defenders of human rights from John Locke and 
Thomas Jefferson to John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.  David Little’s hero, Roger 
Williams -- the founder of seventeenth-century Rhode Island and an exemplary liberal 
Calvinist, in Little’s judgment -- gets a full and learned chapter explicating his prescient 
theory of religious and civil freedom, and its eventual influence on American 
constitutionalism. Throughout the Essays, Little offers insightful histories of and 
commentaries on American, European, and international human rights and religious 
freedom norms on the books and in action.  He also makes memorable contributions to 
 
 
our understanding of the history, logic, and institutional forms of international peace 
studies.  Notable is a major new chapter on “Terrorism, Public Emergency, and 
International Order” that shows how the systematic violation of fundamental human 
rights triggers the duties and demands of revolution and just warfare, historically and 
today.  Two other chapters call for academics to play constructive, critical, and prophetic 
roles in times of war, with Reinhold Niebuhr held up as an exemplar. “In times of war, 
laws and rights [iura] are silent,” the Roman Stoic Cicero once said; in a modern 
democracy, Little argues, it is the special task of scholars to give laws and rights their 
full voice and valence. 
In a moving “Personal Testament,” first published in 2002 and reproduced in the 
Essays, Little makes clear that his devotion to the field of human rights and religious 
freedom is not merely a dispassionate academic pursuit.  For him it is a profoundly 
Christian commitment and calling.  Little was born into a Presbyterian family with roots 
that go back to the New England Puritans who gave America its first comprehensive 
“Body of Liberties” in 1641 written by Calvinist theologian and jurist, Nathaniel Ward.  
His father and five generations of Littles before that were all Presbyterian ministers. 
Little describes himself as a “liberal” Presbyterian layman, with an iron firm grip not only 
on the particularities of Calvinist theology but also on certain “substantive necessary 
truths” as he calls them, echoing Judith Jarvis Thomson. 
Among these “substantive necessary truths,” Little focuses on the idea that all 
humans have moral intuitions that are shaped by moral laws and protected by natural 
rights that are endemic to human nature.  These moral intuitions condemn as utterly evil 
(malum in se) the cruel logic of pain that supports grave and gratuitous assaults on the 
body through genocide, torture, mayhem, starvation, rape, and enslavement, or on the 
mind through brutal coercion, pervasive mind controls, or hallucinogenic enslavement.  
For Little, these moral intuitions and natural aversions are foundational to any real 
regime of human rights. They are part and product of the Western Christian tradition, 
which uncovered and articulated them only after centuries of hard and cruel experience, 
he shows in this book and several earlier writings.   
But these are not merely Christian or Western intuitions, Little insists. Cast more 
generically and generously, these moral intuitions are the cardinal axioms of human 
civilization -- of what it means and takes to live together as persons and peoples. Other 
major traditions and cultures of thought, conscience, and belief have their own way of 
formulating them and their own means of implementing them through personal habits, 
institutional structures, and legal systems.  But, “it is important to remember,” Little 
insists, “that behind or beneath all the many differences among human beings in 
culture, religion, outlook, and knowledge, these are indubitable and unifying features 
that are accessible and applicable to ‘all peoples and all nations’.” 
Little expands on these “indubitable and unifying features” of human nature and 
human society in a brilliant and lengthy new essay entitled “Ground to Stand On,” the 
themes of which pervade several other Essays as well as Little’s Afterword to Religion 
and Public Policy.  Here Little defends what he calls a “two tiered” theory of rights: (1) a 
 
 
first tier theory of rights that is objective and secular, and universally accessible, 
acceptable, and sufficient to ground a legal and political order; and (2) various second 
tier theories that are more particularly religious and by definition more subjective, 
metaphysical, pluralistic, and restricted to distinctive communities of thought and belief.  
The first tier formulations of rights as universals of human nature and society are 
enforceable – even by force.  The second tier formulations of rights (as particular claims 
of certain beliefs and communities) are only voluntary and cannot be compelled or 
forced upon any one.  
Little’s main focus is the first tier, “secular” arguments for human rights that the 
modern world has come to see as a moral minimum for civilization and justice.  He 
focuses on protecting all persons against the infliction of arbitrary force in violation of 
their “non-derogable,” “nonabridgeable,” or “fundamental” rights as the international 
human rights instruments call them. Included are rights to freedom from “extrajudicial 
killing; torture, ‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment’; freedom from 
mutilation; enslavement;” deliberate starvation and gratuitous denials of other basic 
goods and benefits to survive; “denials of certain forms of due process; and violations of 
freedom of conscience, religion, or belief”; discrimination “solely on the grounds of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin”; and freedom from “atrocity crimes” 
defined by the international laws of just war.  For an individual, group, or nation for no 
“very good reason” to violate these non-derogable rights constitutes “arbitrary force,” 
Little argues.  And to fail to uphold, enforce, or vindicate such non-derogable rights, 
“where feasible, would constitute arbitrary neglect, a close relative of arbitrary force.”  
In one sense, Little’s argument about arbitrary force, neglect, and harm is 
continuous with earlier Christian and later liberal arguments that a tyrant’s pervasive 
and persistent violation of the people’s fundamental rights triggers the foundational right 
to resistance, revolution, and even regicide.  Modern democracies were built on this 
premise, as various declarations of independence attest.  But while earlier thinkers 
defined “fundamental rights” based on the Bible, natural law, ancient charters, or self-
evident truths, Little wants to root them in universal facts of human nature -- most 
basically every person’s natural aversion to arbitrary pain and harm.  While earlier 
thinkers were focused on justifying their revolts against tyrants oppressing their own 
people, Little wants to broaden the logic to help define just wars and necessary 
humanitarian interventions on behalf of other peoples as well.  And while earlier thinkers 
coupled natural law and natural rights with natural duties, virtues, and prescriptions for 
the good life and good society -- often grounding and interweaving them in elaborate 
theological and philosophical systems of religion and belief -- Little wants to limit natural 
law and rights talk to this minimum set of protections, without a metaphysical 
foundation.   
Freedom from arbitrary force, neglect, and abuse is an entirely “secular” or 
“natural” foundation of human rights that any conscious and conscientious person or 
people can embrace, regardless of whatever particular forms of thought, conscience, 
religion, or belief they may hold.  In support of this claim, Little works hard to ground his 
argument in theories of common sense, practical reason, and moral intuition. He draws 
 
 
on accounts of conscience, custom, and ethical objectivity.  He points to evidence of his 
views in the cardinal teachings and practices of all major religious and cultural traditions 
today if not historically.  And he begins to sort out the inevitable hard questions and 
rationales of how, when, and why “non-arbitrary” force may, should, and sometimes 
must be used by an individual, group, or nation, to prevent, stop, or punish someone 
else’s exercise of arbitrary force and neglect. Though a full ventilation of these topics 
will take several more books, indeed libraries, what we have here is the bold and bright 
outline of an integrative theory of human rights, just war, humanitarian intervention, and 
international peace.   
This argument is directed partly against the growing number of scholars who 
deny the existence of human rights or the universal validity of rights talk.  It is also 
directed against the growing number of religious scholars, who insist that a theory of 
rights cannot be sustained without a necessary religious or metaphysical foundation or 
rationale.  Little argues that his position was a feature of “liberal Protestant” thought 
from the beginning – even in the foundational works of John Calvin and Martin Luther.  
It can be embraced, he insists, by any religious tradition that operates with a two 
kingdoms ontology, or that draws basic epistemological distinctions between nature and 
grace, reason and faith, the external forum and internal forum.  Little is all for the 
protection of religious freedom, and for the articulation of religious rights theories, 
practices, and platforms.  And he recognizes that protection of religious freedom often 
correlates with protection of many other “non-derogable” rights in nation-states.  But he 
wants human rights to have a deeper and more universal foundation in human nature, 
and a compelling logic that will convince even those who today reject religion altogether.   
Religion and Public Policy devotes several chapters to the expansion and 
evaluation of these major themes.  The lead editor, Sumner Twiss, has a brilliant 
chapter on Roger Williams’s theory of religious freedom and human rights, vindicating 
Little’s longstanding praise for this early American prophet of liberty, and lifting up 
several provocative texts from Williams that have not been part of the standard 
histories.  Marian Simion opens up the riches of the Orthodox Christian tradition on the 
right to life, and its implications for just war and human rights thinking along lines 
congenial to David Little.  Rodney Petersen shows how diplomats can operationalize 
Little’s “arbitrary force” and “arbitrary neglect” ethics in political diplomacy.  Leading 
Catholic scholars Bryan Hehir and Scott Appleby defend Little’s insistence that policies 
of just war making and peace building must include humanitarian intervention and 
negotiation with diverse religious bodies at home and abroad.  While the dominant 
political and media narrative continues to depict religion as the source of violence and 
oppression, and while un-nuanced “separation of church and state” arguments continue 
to feed the idea that “peace studies” should be “religion free,” the chapters by Appleby, 
Susan Hayward, Atalia Omer, Scott Hibbard, Natalie Sherman and David Gergen all 
demonstrate the vital role of “religious peacebuilders” in many parts of the world, and 
the need for such peaceable and peacemaking groups to have the rights, resources, 
and respect they need to do their work effectively.  But separating just and unjust, 
magnanimous and malevolent religious actors in the protection of human rights for all 
 
 
remains a major challenge, especially in times of tumult and transition and new 
constitutional formation.  
While all the chapters express admiration and appreciation for Little’s remarkable 
accomplishments, they offer a few challenges, too.  Gene Outka and the undersigned, 
for example, question how much Little’s theory can be grounded in John Calvin or the 
broader Calvinist tradition, which tied religion and human rights more closely together in 
a way that makes Roger Williams look like more of an outlier than exemplar of the 
Calvinist tradition. John Reeder queries some of the philosophical assumptions and 
moves at work in Little’s intuitionist theory of arbitrary force and harm.  Grace Kao 
wonders whether this argument against arbitrary pain could and should be extended to 
protect the rights of animals and proto-sentient nature.  Abdulaziz Sachedina and 
Ronald Swearer question how compatible a “two-tiered” theory of rights can be for many 
schools of Islam and Buddhism.  The Afterword is vintage David Little: candid and 
forceful engagement with his interlocutors, with careful and insightful distinctions and 
sage and soaring prose designed to push the conversation forward.  May it long 
continue. 
   
